All this adds weight to the feeling that September's seasonality sell offs are this year going to return to the Euro zone, just when all eyes are pinned on the US.
But for now we leave you with a postcard we were asked to pop in the post to Germany.
Team Macro Man is sure they are not alone in struggling for inspiration in these summer markets, so it seems like a perfect time for another batch of questions.
Because that's what they do. TMM is reminded of a time, many years ago when they were fresh-faced naive graduates doing a trading simulation where the guy running the training programme made the simulation do stupid things that make no sense and would never happen in real life just to throw us off. How mistaken we were... Perhaps the PBOC hired the guy?
A theme TMM are particularly swayed by at the moment is that competitive devaluations under the guise of "efforts to fight deflationary risks" are likely to result in trade frictions that have the potential to get nasty. As per yesterday's post, we think the Japanese have done their bit as far as being a good global citizen is concerned (the trade-weighted Yen has appreciated by 47% since it bottomed in 2007), and it is time for others to make a contribution. To be fair to the other big Current Account surplus country, Germany, their import growth has begun to outstrip their export growth, which means they are starting to do their bit, and the Eurozone as a whole essentially has a balanced Current Account. But the Chinese? They have done Nada.
It turns out "increased flexibility" just meant "we'll do a quick half-percent move so it looks like we're doing something and we'll just make it more volatile so we can screw the speculators". They must've learned that one from the French. In terms of cumulative appreciation since the announcement, we have pretty much flat-lined around 0.6% (chart below, purple line), looking not too different from the Hong Kong Dollar - a currency that is pegged (orange line). They say that they're targeting a Nominal Effective Exchange Rate-based policy, which is fair enough (Singapore do that too), but if they are, they clearly want their currency weaker because that's what it's done the past two months (green line).
Well, they certainly made it a bit more volatile, but it still looks a lot like the HKD:
But as far as TMM can see, they're just doing their usual currency piss-taking. TMM don't think it will be long before US politicians cotton on to this fact, especially if the Japanese do start to intervene, and the resulting noise could get very nasty.
But let's get to the point of this piece. There has been a lot of noise and jaw-boning about the Japan intervening in the Yen, with a very rare joint BoJ/Government statement about the risk it poses to Japan's economy, and the political debate around this appears to have reached a consensus that verbal intervention is no longer proving an effective deterrent against Yen strength. TMM is increasingly of the opinion that the bar to intervention in the Yen is now very low - not just because policymakers appear to have reached a consensus, but the key conditions that have been consistent with successful FX intervention in the past are now virtually all in place. The single remaining condition is a sharp upward move in the Yen of 2-3% which, given last week's low in USDJPY is very close, seems pretty likely to happen.
So what are the conditions? Looking back at past FX interventions, they have generally been successful if they have occurred when: (i) the FX market isn't pricing the relative economic outlooks of the two countries properly (whatever that means...), (ii) there has been a large "mis-valuation" of the real exchange rate, (iii) market positioning is large and viewing the trade as a one-way bet, and (iv) there has been increased momentum in the market moves.
As far as (i) is concerned, we can get a sense of the relative economic outlooks of the two countries by looking at a spread of real interest rates over the short to medium term (e.g. 5yr) because these will price in the relative policy paths of central banks, which themselves are a function of economic conditions. TMM wanted to use consensus economist forecasts historically, but getting that data has proved somewhat challenging - if they were wearing their tin foil beanies, they'd swear it was a cover up of their horrendous forecasting records! But on a serious note, the below chart shows the 5yr real rate spread between the US and Japan (brown line) vs. USDJPY (green line). [We used TIPS yields from 1997 for the US and Inflation Swaps from 2007 in Japan, prior to those periods, we used the 5yr bond yield minus CPI]. It's pretty clear that on this measure, USDJPY has diverged pretty significantly from the fixed income markets' views of the relative economic outlook, a condition that was not met particularly in early-2009, the last time the Japanese triggered a G7 statement on the Yen. That's a "tick" then.
Moving on to (ii), the Real Exchange Rate... the below chart shows the percentage deviation of the ratio of the Dollar to Yen Broad Real Exchange rates from its 5yr moving average. Looks to be about 15% undervalued. Another "tick"...
As FX punters will know, working out how players are positioned in the FX market is difficult, as we only have data for CTAs (via the CFTC - see below chart of Yen longs) and for Mrs Watanabe. Clearly CTAs are very long of Yen, as is Mrs Watanabe, and TMM gets the sense that traders more broadly are also long the Yen. While we can't be certain here (proxy measures of the OTC market positioning such as Risk Reversals are clouded by their risk-on/off correlation and Black Swan derivative hedging), TMM thinks (iii) is a "tick" too.
Finally, market momentum (iv)... for such an esoteric concept, it's possible to come up with many measures. For example, it's pretty obvious when there is a large 3day move, but in terms of the underlying momentum in the FX market, TMM particularly likes using the 3month, 5day skip momentum measure (see chart below). In recent days we have surpassed the "normal range" for this, but are not quite at the levels exhibited in March 2008 (as the PRDC crowd were being taught about gamma) or Q4 2008. The point here is that the bar is not particularly high for this to move higher to the point where policymakers would act. TMM is of the opinion that a relatively quick 2-3% move is all that is needed to trigger this condition... we'll call it a "half tick".
One of TMM's mates this morning suggested that a further condition is support from other nations' policymakers. It's a fair point, in that coordinated intervention has only failed on one occasion (the Louvre Accord), while single country intervention has failed on several. TMM cannot help but point to Voldemort et al who have successfully intervened for many years now...
We digress... TMM thinks the BoJ are getting pretty close to adding the letters "LLC" to their name.
The biggest loser from recent US monetary policy has been the Nikkei, which has seen a 6.2% top to bottom move since the FOMC announcement through the US/JP rate spreads driving USD/JPY and hence, the Nikkei. This, of course, is being exacerbated by the Yen being the new default counter currency as we are so keen to sell everything else (see below chart: USDJPY - white, Nikkei - orange, 2yr US/Japan yield spread - yellow, 10yr US/Japan yield spread - green).

So we are back to a good old fashioned FX theme of trying to guess if the BoJ will try and do something about it and how. If they come in and buy cart loads of USDs there is no way they then want to park them back in Treasuries, as it is the US/JP yield spread compression that is the original cause of the problems. In fact, probably the best way for them to intervene is to sell their holdings of treasuries and bring it back down the curve and hold it as cash and hope it starts spreads widening again. Does that mean that Joe Public is paying back his maturing mortgages to Japan via the Fed taking the cash off their MBS maturities and using it to buy their Treasuries back from Japan? But what happens to the cash? The Japanese put it on deposit where it finds its way back onto to bank balance sheets and they use it to buy Treasuries again. Hmmmm.
Perhaps they should take the USDs in cash, actual paper notes, and burn them, effectively destroying the problem of too many USDs. So they can effectively print their own money and get the double whammy of QE'ing themselves, while deQE'ing the US. The extreme sport version of competitive devaluations, where you actually try and destroy someone else's currency faster than they can print it. If this took off seriously it would make Mugabe mighty bid as Finance Minister. So much for Austrian Economics, how about following the Zimbabwe school? Is there any value in burning money? TMM once worked out the price of oil needed to make it cheaper to burn Dollar bills instead in terms of cost per Kj output. From what we can remember, it came out at about $360,000 per barrel. Some way off yet, but if Voldemort is going to join in and burn his USD reserves that’s about 7,000,000 barrels of oils worth.
Though that may sound absolutely ridiculous it appears the money multiplier has gone into parabolic hyperspace where nothing is impossible.
We are afraid that this is all still heading towards more and more blatant FX manipulation which just increases the chances of trade sanctions and tariffs. The gloves may not yet be off but their laces are undone, so for now the market is back in prodding mode and will keep it up on JPY until they get something more substantive than today's BoJ mumble which came straight out of their ancient book of obfuscation.
The general panic mood of yesterday seems to have faded and as the dust clears we see a new landscape revealed with Euro center stage and previously neglected Euro-negatives being pulled out of the draw and dusted off. But this is not feeling like a general panic and is sectoral now rather than general. In fact, we are only back to levels we were at a month ago in most things and "most things" charts all look the same these days. So we look at this, so far , being a positional and reality rebalancing back to middle of summer range rather than the start of the "next big thing". And though a complete guess, it wouldn't surprise us if the next big thing involved a PIIS poor bank catalyst. The "G" has gone already, and so we hereby copyright the use of the term "PIIS" and all such headlines derived therefrom, such as "PIIS poor" etc.