Wednesday, March 27, 2013

Eurogroup English Dictionary (EED)

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Trying to decode what the Eurogroup is saying into English is getting harder as policy becomes less distinct. However we have uncovered a small segment of the equivilent of the Rosetta stone. Plain English on the left and Eurogroup English on the right. We hope this helps.

    Irish    (adj) - Not Greek

    Portuguese    (adj) - Not Irish

    Spanish    (adj) - Not Portuguese

    Italian    (adj) - Not Cypriot

    Cypriot    (adj) - Unique

    Ubiquitous    (adj) - Unique

    Systemic    (adj) - Unique

    Endemic    (adj) - Unique

    Theft    (n) - 1) Tax 2) contribution 3) Fair share.

    Deposit    (n) - Bank share holding.

    Depositor    (n) - Money Launderer

    Uninsured Deposit Loss    (n) - Insured Deposit Protection

    Capital Control    (n) - Cautionary measures.

    Economic Collapse    (n) - Difficult times.

    Discord    (n) - Unity

    Compromise    (n) - Strong Agreement

    Retard    (n) - Dutch Finance Minister

    Own Goal    (n) - Mr Dijesselbloem's statement

    Vague Idea    (n) - A Commitment.

    Hope    (n) - Commitment to the commitment

    Inappropriate    (adj) - Template

    Unsuitable    (adj) - Template

    Master Plan    (n) - Template

    Template    (n) - Not a template

    Dead Cat Bounce    (n) - Encouraging signs

    Dysfunctional Family    (n) - Europe

    German Foreign Policy     (n) - European rescue program.

    Economic Repression    (n) - Prudent policy.

    Vengeance    (n) - Necessary adjustments.

    Free Market    (n) - Moral hazard

    Haphazard Moral Hazard    (n) - Flexible policy.

    U-turn    (v) - Clarification of earlier statements.

    Implicit Guarantee     (n) - Will do what is necessary

    Panic    (v) - Urgently striving to do what is necessary

    Failed to do what was necessary    (n) - Rapidly changing environment.

    Pommel Horse    (n) - Cyprus Parliament

    Whipping Boys    (n) - Cypriot Government

    Outrageous Assumption    (n) - Realistic target

    Last Hope    (n) - Mr Draghi

    Fourth Reich    (n) - The Eurogroup

Monday, March 25, 2013

The Eurogroup Statement on Cyprus Translated.

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Team Macro Man offer their translation of the Eurogroup Statement on Cyprus. The original is in italics.

The Eurogroup has reached an agreement with the Cypriot authorities on the key elements necessary for a future macroeconomic adjustment programme. This agreement is supported by all euro area Member States as well as the three institutions. The Eurogroup fully supports the Cypriot people in these difficult circumstances.


We the 4th Reich Eurogroup  have finally pulled a moth eaten 3 legged rabbit out of the hat. The Eurogroup agrees with itself even if Cyprus is not at all happy with it. We fully support the Cypriot people through the difficult circumstances we have foisted on them (but not that much because it was their fault).

The programme will address the exceptional challenges that Cyprus is facing and restore the viability of the financial sector, with the view of restoring sustainable growth and sound public finances over the coming years.


We will restore the financial sector from being a multibillion Euro earner for Cyprus into a neutered annex of the Bundeathstar (sorry Bundesbank) over the coming years (coming years = 0 to infinity).

The Eurogroup welcomes the plans for restructuring the financial sector as specified in the annex. These measures will form the basis for restoring the viability of the financial sector. In particular, they safeguard all deposits below EUR 100.000 in accordance with EU principles.


We welcome our own plans. Please note or even praise us for standing by the deposit guarantee of E100k. As it is part of EU wide law, there is no way would we have ever suggested otherwise.

The programme will contain a decisive approach to addressing financial sector imbalances. There will be an appropriate downsizing of the financial sector, with the domestic banking sector reaching the EU average by 2018. In addition, the Cypriot authorities have reaffirmed their commitment to step up efforts in the areas of fiscal consolidation, structural reforms and privatisation.


We will downsize any EU economic sectors we don't like to EU averages (excepting the German Industrial sector or anything else German). As, by definition, half the sample must be over the average, if we insist on all those over the average downsizing to the average we should be able drive the average to our ultimate target of zero.

The Eurogroup welcomes the Terms of Reference for an independent evaluation of the implementation of the anti-money laundering framework in Cypriot financial institutions, involving Moneyval alongside a private international audit firm, and is reassured that the launch of the audit is imminent. In the event of problems in the implementation of the framework, problems will be corrected as part of the programme conditionality.


We will plug the competitive advantage that Cyprus had in the banking sector  by introducing online Anti Money Laudering training for all bank staff . Problems will be corrected by insisting on an 80% pass mark over three attempts.

The Eurogroup further welcomes the Cypriot authorities' commitment to take further measures. These measures include the increase of the withholding tax on capital income and of the statutory corporate income tax rate. The Eurogroup looks forward to an agreement between Cyprus and the Russian Federation on a financial contribution.

We are glad that Cyprus is at last doing what we tell them and look forward to them doing what Russia tells them too. As long as it involves Russia bunging in some money too.

The Eurogroup urges the immediate implementation of the agreement between Cyprus and Greece on the Greek branches of the Cypriot banks, which protects the stability of both the Greek and Cypriot banking systems.

Can you please make sure this doesn't screw up Greece again? If it does it will be Cyprus's fault. Or Greece's. But not ours.

The Eurogroup requests the Cypriot authorities and the Commission, in liaison with the ECB, and the IMF to finalise the MoU at staff level in early April.

And can Cyprus actually sign the agreement this time, preferably by April, rather than wriggling out of it at a later date as they usually do?

The Eurogroup notes the intention of the Cypriot authorities to compensate potential individual victims of fraudulent practices, in line with established legal and judicial procedures, outside the programme.

If you are mugged at the ATM trying to get your E100 out call the police, not us.

The Eurogroup takes note of the authorities' decision to introduce administrative measures, appropriate in view of the present unique and exceptional situation of Cyprus' financial sector and to allow for a swift reopening of the banks. The Eurogroup stresses that these administrative measures will be temporary, proportionate and non-discriminatory, and subject to strict monitoring in terms of scope and duration in line with the Treaty.

Once again this is a unique situation. Like Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Italy and Spain were all unique. Financial problems in the EU are like fingerprints - They are all unique but everyone has at least one but more likely ten. Administrative measures are temporary and in no way should be considered "temporary" as in the administration of Vichy France.

Against this background, the Eurogroup reconfirms, as stated already on 16 March, that – in principle - financial assistance to Cyprus is warranted to safeguard financial stability in Cyprus and the euro area as a whole by providing financial assistance for an amount of up to EUR 10bn. The Eurogroup would welcome a contribution by the IMF to the financing of the programme. Together with the decisions taken by Cyprus, this results in a fully financed programme which will allow Cyprus’ public debt to remain on a sustainable path.

We would rather not have had to donate anything but have been forced to hand over  E10bil. Having done all the leg work its only fair that the IMF bung in their lump too. And Russia but that's a long shot so we won't mention it again.

The Eurogroup expects that the ESM Board of Governors will be in a position to formally approve the proposal for a financial assistance facility agreement by the third week of April 2013 subject to the completion of national procedures.

We want this tied down asap before someone changes their mind.

Annex

Following the presentation by the Cyprus authorities of their policy plans, which were broadly welcomed by the Eurogroup, the following was agreed:

1. Laiki will be resolved immediately - with full contribution of equity shareholders, bond holders and uninsured depositors - based on a decision by the Central Bank of Cyprus, using the newly adopted Bank Resolution Framework.


Laiki to the Abattoir

2. Laiki will be split into a good bank and a bad bank. The bad bank will be run down over time.


The three tons of entrails will be left to rot in the corner and the one gram of edible meat will be put in the freezer.

3. The good bank will be folded into Bank of Cyprus (BoC), using the Bank Resolution Framework, after having heard the Boards of Directors of BoC and Laiki. It will take 9 bn Euros of ELA with it. Only uninsured deposits in BoC will remain frozen until recapitalisation has been effected, and may subsequently be subject to appropriate conditions.

A small part of the good meat will be seasoned with E9bil and served at the table of BoC, the rest will be left in the freezer.

4. The Governing Council of the ECB will provide liquidity to the BoC in line with applicable rules.

The ECB will provide liquidity under the usual conditions (like those applied by most payday loan companies) and of course default will mean the bailiffs popping round again.

5. BoC will be recapitalised through a deposit/equity conversion of uninsured deposits with full contribution of equity shareholders and bond holders.


We will make the BoC look stronger by switching real money for monopoly money.

6. The conversion will be such that a capital ratio of 9 % is secured by the end of the programme.


We will back engineer everything to fit our own rules.

7. All insured depositors in all banks will be fully protected in accordance with the relevant EU legislation.


All insured depositors in all banks will be fully protected in accordance with the relevant EU legislation unless we change our minds.

8. The programme money (up to 10bn Euros) will not be used to recapitalise Laiki and Bank of Cyprus.


Because there won't be much left over after we have paid all our admin and implementation teams we will sending over to run this scheme.

The Eurogroup is convinced that this solution is the best way forward for ensuring the overall viability and stability of the Cyprus financial system and its capability to finance the Cyprus economy.


We think this is a really good idea of ours and is in fact so good we should consider using it as a template for all banks in the EU. But no-one is to mention that. Mr Dijsselbloem included. Oh shit he hasn't has he?



Saturday, March 23, 2013

"Draghi Where's your Euros"

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Whilst we wait for the outcome of the current round of Cypriot negotiations, let's have a jolly song, or shanty, to cheer things up. With no apologies whatsoever to Andy Stewart, TMM give you their version of the Scottish classic "Donald Where's your Troosers"




"Draghi Where's Your Euros"

I'm back for a while from the Cyprus Isle
Where if you want your cash you'll need some guile
And all the locals shout with bile,
"Draghi, Where's your Euros?"

Let the debt blow high and the growth blow low
We'll levy a tax on your depo
Russia won't pay so the the Cyp's all go,
"Draghi, Where's your Euros?"


I sat in on a conference call
There was slippery talk between them all
And I was afeared that Europe would fall
'Cause they wouldn't give them Euros

Let the debt blow high and the growth blow low
We'll levy a tax on your depo
Russia won't pay so the the Cyp's all go,
"Draghi, Where's your Euros?"


I went for a loan to a German town
But all I got was a Schaeuble frown
And a scream from the Lady who won't turn around,
"Draghi, there not your Euros!"

Let the debt blow high and the growth blow low
We'll levy a tax on your depo
Russia won't pay so the the Cyp's all go,
"Draghi, Where's your Euros?"


The Germans have bound this Superman,
And the Troika want another billion
I've done everything that I possibly can
So don't ask me for Euros.

Let the debt blow high and the growth blow low
We'll levy a tax on your depo
Russia won't pay so the the Cyp's all go,
"Draghi, Where's your Euros?"


Let Cyprus leave or let them stay
It doesn't matter either way
We can't arrange a piss-up in a breweray
We've buggered up the Euro!


Friday, March 22, 2013

TMM thoughts on Cyprotoxins

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- The EU group is suffering from the weak leadership of the Dutch Finance Minister. The pasting he received in the EU Parliament yesterday was fully justified. He even apologised for not getting it right & said it was for us to decide if they were incompetent! TMM answer with a firm "YES!".

- This lack of leadership within EU policymaking has led to an impasse: The recent Eurogroup statements barely disguise the complete lack of agreement as "German Economics" espoused by an election driven Schaeuble, with its determination to force internal devaluations on the periphery, going unopposed.

- German Pressure is compromising ECB freedoms to do its job. The ECB has announced that it will not provide ELA to insolvent banks and will turn off the tap on Monday without a bailout. First, the ECB/ELA *can* lend to insolvent banks and has done so in the past (Anglo Irish). Second, and more importantly, the ECB is shirking its core responsibility of lender of last resort.

- Is Draghi happy with having his mandate hamstrung? TMM severely doubt it and wonder if his silence hides deeper ire that is too dangerous to publicise.

- Precedent-setting, no matter what they claim - calls into question whether the OMT can be employed in large enough scale to prevent EUR exit risk premia arising in peripheral market.

- Imposing depositor haircuts across the board (again, let's not kid ourselves: Barclays Nicosia is hardly a bankrupt bank) has de facto devalued the Euro in Nicosia. It is now worth just 0.92 Berlin Euros. This, in TMM's view, is a catastrophic policy error for Europe.

- Cyprus solution has broken THE MOST IMPORTANT FUNDAMENTAL PILLAR that supports EMU: A Euro in Berlin is both worth the *SAME* as a Euro in Nicosia, and entirely fungible. This reminds us of the similar breakdown the Federal Reserve System in the 1930s where Bills of the NY Fed were discounted elsewhere.

- Similarly, the ECB's attempt to force Cyprus to adopt capital controls is a hugely misguided endeavour, for it *too* violates this fundamental premise

- The Target 2 system was designed to prevent Balance of Payments crises between member states, not for the purpose of economic war. ECB threats to cut the Cypriot Central Bank off from its window (don't buy the ECB/German rhetoric: it's the Cypriot Central Bank that is being cut off here, not the domestic banks, given it intermediates the Target 2 balance & ELA facility to the domestic banks), & similarly the possibility of Cyprus defaulting on its Target 2 balances have turned a payments system designed to prevent crisis into the economic equivalent of a Nuclear strike. Political interference (and TMM would include the German contingent of the ECB here) should never have been allowed to interfere with this system.

- By just announcing that deposits could be haircut, the Troika have unleashed very powerful forces that will inevitably result in the deposit base of Cyprus' banks evaporating via capital flight. This, by definition, will cause a collapse in the money supply & a deep recession.

- TMM's men on the ground in Cyprus report that today, the economy has, unsurprisingly, primarily become a "cash only" economy.

- Imposing limits on cash withdrawals, online payments etc simply results in *a collapse of the velocity of money*. The economic effect is likely to be the same as if the money supply collapsed via deposit flight.  MV = PQ = GDP. Cyprus's economy is being hit by an unforced policy error of the type usually seen in chaotic EM crises.

- The policy of limiting cash withdrawals was tried in December 2001 in Argentina - known as the Corralito. It failed spectacularly - within a couple of weeks. Riots eventually forced the President to flee as economic transactions became virtually impossible. Default & devaluation quickly followed.

  - Cyprus is thus in the early stages of experiencing what it would do were it to leave the Euro: (i) a household liquidity crisis, (ii) a paralysed financial system, (iii) a collapse in monetary velocity, (iv) a large loss of national wealth, (v) capital controls, (vi) shortages of imported basic goods [trade credit for Cyprus now non-existent],  and (vii) an exceptionally deep recession.

- The "Alternative" that the Cypriot government (with the encouragement of the ECB) is to impose Capital Controls & deposit withdrawal limits. Under Article 63 of the Treaty, these are illegal. There is, of course, a clause that allows governments to do this with a "macro prudential" remit. However, TMM totally call "horse sh1t" on the idea that such measures are "prudential", and given that they have been made up in a very short amount of time before properly thinking them through, imagine that a Court may well agree that an injunction be imposed until policy has been properly considered, instead of rushing into potentially damaging actions.

- TMM are opinion that imposing capital controls drastically increases the probability of Cyprus exiting the Euro.

- This state of affairs, TMM believe, is entirely unsustainable. Given the drastic recession that is about to occur, government debt will blow out again, requiring a further bailout in 6months. Germany has declared that there will be no more money. Cyprus would then have to leave the Euro *anyway*.

-  TMM used to have a German boss many years ago who once described German foreign policy as such : "You throw in a hand grenade, wait for the dust to settle and walk straight through. Don't even bother counting the bodies". They appear to be sticking to their rule book. But then, what else would you expect from Germany?

- TMM think that  the Rest of World is numbed to Euroblx and is happy using the "just muddle through" model to trade on, having been severely roasted last year expecting the opposite.


- TMM think this creates a more dangerous environment for markets as complacency levels with respect to Europe are at levels not seen for some time.

Tuesday, March 19, 2013

TMM's Radical Plan for Cyprus

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TMM continue to be staggered by just how confused the Eurogroup policy response has been, with the Germans et al running away from the deposit levy on small depositors at an Usain Bolt-like pace. Last night's statement in particular smacked of the imperialist European leadership tampering with the evidence. TMM still cannot fathom how the Troika could not see that such a policy move would go down so badly both in Cyprus and internationally - even the German press utterly slated the deal. Another case of the Germans refusing to listen to anyone - TMM have personal experience in dealing with German Finance Ministry officials, to whom the term "arrogant" simply cannot do justice to their intransigence nor their complete inability to understand that there is no magic source of exogenous demand that will fill the gaps left by their nuclear winter-like economic prescriptions.

If the newly-elected Cypriot government were not clearly so inexperienced & naive, TMM could almost imagine that they have played the politics of this blindingly, by supposedly applying the tax to small savers, the Germans have been saddled with the blame. It is hard to imagine the political outrage being so vehement had the tax only applied to uninsured depositors, and no amount of finger pointing or insisting "it wasn't us" is likely to undo this.

But whatever. We are here now, and given the cries from both the Troika & various commentators pointing out that you can't solve a debt crisis without hitting creditors, TMM thought they'd have their own go at formulating a crisis resolution plan for Cyprus.

In the light of the EU using the explicit threat of Euro exit, and seemingly this threat not being a bluff - indeed threatening to cut off ELA access is akin to forcing Cyprus out of the Euro - TMM are going to invoke a strategy that they believe would be advocated by the great Paul Nitze who helped formulate Cold War policy. And this is to respond in a similar radical way, gradually increasing the stakes. So here goes:

Cyprus needs EUR 17.5bn - 10bn for the banks, 6bn for debt rollovers & 1bn for deficit financing. The EU/IMF will supply 10bn, but for the moment, we are going to assume they will supply nothing, as TMM believe that their plan will go down like a cup of cold sick in Brussels & Frankfurt. But hey, shit happens, and they went nuclear on Cyprus - you reap what you sow...

TMM are going to draw on a two bank restructurings that have taken place since 2008: the first, Wachovia, where creditors of the holding company were hung out to dry as Wachovia Bank was seized & given to JPM. The second, Bradford & Bingley, where the deposits of the bank were sold to Santander & the "bad" part of the bank nationalised by the British government. The reason TMM bring these two restructurings up, is that we believe that Cyprus can do something similar. And before you say "Ah... but the only creditors are depositors", this isn't entirely so: Cypriot banks have accessed the ECB's ELA to the tune of about EUR 9.2bn.

So TMM propose the Cypriot Government do the following  - they'll have to do it very quickly to avoid the ECB panicking and pulling back the ELA cash lent against dodgy collateral. Once done, the ECB will not be able to do anything about it.

  1. Transfer all bank deposits & unencumbered assets from the existing Cypriot banks to new bank holding companies: e.g. Cyprus Phoenix Bank. This should include the transfer of IT infrastructure, the branch network & any tangible assets like real estate (e.g. the banks' HQs).
  2. Let the old banks go bankrupt, leaving the ECB with EUR 9bn of losses and wiping out both the subordinated & senior bondholders (EUR 1.75bn).
  3. These new banks are now adequately capitalised & under EU law, the ECB will not be able to prevent their participation in Target 2 via the Central Bank of Cyprus. The ECB may well kick & scream, but there will be nothing they can do about it.
  4. Domestic Bills/Bonds haircut by 80% for non-Cypriot banks. Although their non-bank ownership is small, every little helps, & using JPM's ownership estimates, this would produce ~EUR 820m.
  5. The international bonds under UK (with a 75% CAC hurdle) are certainly tough to PSI, but let's all be realistic, there's no money left & government debt is at astronomically large amounts of GDP. TMM believe that Cyprus will be more successful than market punters reckon in restructuring this debt. And of course, they can also just unilaterally default on the debt. Again, an 80% haircut here sounds realistic, producing EUR 3.04bn.
  6. Adding the Gas reserve privatisation (which JPM estimate at EUR 4.2bn), TMM have found EUR 18.9bn. 
  7. Cyprus could also, of course negotiate with the Russians to restructure the EUR 2.5bn loan, and if they are able to get say 20% NPV reduction on this, they could make the terms on the international bond restructuring less-onerous.
So there you have it: EUR 18.9bn without recourse to the Troika.

This approach also reduces the extremely negative economic effect that an upfront wealth shock imposes upon consumption, and also will to some degree reduce the ballcrenching tightening of monetary conditions as Cyprus' deposit base flees the country. Many have pointed out that inflation (e.g. in the UK) has the same net effect in terms of imposing costs on creditors, but this is not entirely true: moderate inflation & negative real rates as seen in the UK smooth the deleveraging process so that monetary conditions remain loose and the negative wealth effect is more gradual. The Troika's proposal for Cyprus does the complete opposite as it will ensure extremely tight monetary policy as the money supply evaporates, and provide a large one of hit to consumption via the wealth effect. In TMM's view this will merely result in Cyprus' recession becoming much deeper and its debt level blowing out once more to the point of needing a second bail out programme. Once again, this is the result of the Germans' inability to understand that there is no magical source of exogenous demand.

Monday, March 18, 2013

Cyprus Again

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TMM continue to be staggered by the ineptitude of the Eurocrats' response to the Cyprus issue. Haircutting deposits is not something to be done lightly and making a mockery of deposit insurance is really, really dumb . I mean, that's what central banks are meant to do, amongst other things, right? TMM understand the tempation to give a "number three back and sides" to a lot of fairly iffy Russian cash but, once again it has to be impressed on Germany that crises are a lot more "Run Lola Run" or "The Great Escape" than "Faust": the point is to get out with minimum collateral damage first and mete out punishments and lessons in morality second and hope you can regulate them out of existence afterwards.

There has been a lot of ink, bits and bytes spent on this already so TMM are going to comfort themselves with some online shopping and hope that the Cypriots at the bare minimum manage to not make deposit insurance worthless.

We have recently discovered one can make custom dart boards at Zazzle, what do you think?

Saturday, March 16, 2013

The Cyprus Conspiracy II

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The title of this post comes from an excellent book TMM would recommend to anyone interested in the rather large historical geopolitical importance of the tiny island of Cyprus. And in TMM's minds, this morning's announcement from the Troika merits a new chapter for this book. For once again, the people of Cyprus have been truly stitched up by foreign powers. TMM issue a passionate plea to the government & peoples of Cyprus to "JUST SAY NO" to this utterly idiotic, stupid idea of haircutting depositors between 6.75% & 9.9% of their money.


TMM believe that this is the worst policy action that European policymakers have come up with to date in this crisis. It simply must be stopped before the upfront wealth hit exacerbates Cyprus' already severe recession as households slash spending in order to repair the hit to their balance sheets (colloquially known as "theft") from this action.


Whenever this policy has been attempted (in Asia in 1997/8, and in Germany in 1919-25) is has failed, either by eventually not being implemented (in the former case), or in total economic catastrophe (in the latter). TMM do not believe the example of the early/mid-1990s in Italy counts here, as it was both negligible (at just 0.6%) and also accompanied by a large devaluation which cushioned the blow and restored competiveness. This is clearly not the case for Cyprus: it is taking the upfront wealth hit that a devaluation would incur, but not gaining any competitiveness as exports become cheaper. This is a clear economic failing in this plan, and will merely result in more of the same as the recession deepens, forcing government debt higher. Reportedly, the Cypriot team were forced into this as the IMF & Germany threatened a haircut of 40%, as would occur in a Euro exit. TMM don't believe this threat: the Troika know just as well as the rest of us that a Euro exit of ANY country brings the Euro down through contagion.


This also fails to consider that many Cypriots have external assets as well, which would provide some cushion in a Euro exit (though TMM are not advocating such a drastic action). TMM believe that Cyprus is about to experience capital flight of a degree not seen by a country since the Emerging Markets crises of the 1990s. The confiscated portion of deposits is being frozen, but now there is no reason why households would wish to hold very much capital in the country - if they can steal from you once, they can steal from you again. And one thing TMM has learned over the years is that you *cannot stop domestic currency outflows*. The Troika have just shouted "FIRE!" in a crowded room: money held in Eurozone banks is not safe, even if it is below the insured limit (more on this below).


Now, onto the implications of this policy action, which TMM believe are far reaching. The Europeans are obviously using the old "this is a one off" line, and a precedent is not being set, but the market, media and population are getting more used to this now. The general approach is to make the borrowers pay in order that French & German banks don't have to take losses. In this respect, TMM cannot understand why bank bondholders have not been restructured. This position is not sustainable, and TMM believe the Cypriot parliament will force this (again, more below). This is a clear repudiation of the legal precedent for creditor hierarchy: *insured deposits sit at the top of the creditor structure* (with only employee salaries & a couple of other minor things higher). The Troika have unilaterally torn up the rule book on this. While attempting to label this as a "tax", it is a clear manipulation of the law, and TMM expect lawsuits both against the banks & government, as well as in the European Court of Human Rights.

More importantly, *de facto, there is no longer a deposit protection scheme in the Eurozone*. This, in TMM's view, will lead the capital flight out of Cyprus to spill-over as contagion to the rest of the iPIGS, with nervous households seeing the news from Cyprus that their money is *NOT* safe in a Eurozone bank. The Troikia & government are trying to put a spin on the move that the money will be exchanged for bank equity, but this just seems to us like smoke & mirrors to try and make this look less like theft- Cypriot bank equity is worthless given its deposit base is about to leave the country.

One idea TMM have had is whether the depositors (as senior creditors of Cyprus' banks) can form a creditor committee to seize the banks (which are demonstrably insolvent) and put them into administration. Such a move would provide protection under bankruptcy law for the banks' assets (including from the tax authorities), and may well result in a greater return to depositors than under the haircut scenario.

TMM strongly urge Cyprus to say "NO!" to the Troika. This is a truly awful deal that will merely serve to seriously exacerbate the recession, spark massive capital flight from Cyprus & probably spark contagion elsewhere in the Eurozone. Of course there are losses that have to be taken, and a tab to be paid. But this is NOT the way to do it.

TMM believe Cyprus instead should default on its external debt, place its banks in administration (and threaten to restructure their repurchase agreements with the ECB unless the Troika ease off), negotiate a loan extension/reduction with the Russian. Or at least go back to the Troika and threaten to the above. The solution the Troika have imposed entails a good portion of the pain that a Euro exit would involve, but without the positive impact a devaluation would provide in terms of competitiveness gains. Given the circumstances, radical actions are required. Cyprus should not allow the Troika to impose a reparation-like punishment on its citizens for the crime of its banks (with the reported encouragement of the Central Bank of Cyprus [i.e. - the ECB]) in buying Greek Government Bonds. Given depositors in Cyprus have not exactly been able to move their deposits to foreign banks over the past 8 years (lack of banking competition), it is hardly fair to argue that depositors, as lenders to Cyprus' banks, should have known better. So much for consumer protection and in particular the insured deposit limit. The fact that this is occuring without bank bondholders being hit is a complete affront to the rule of creditor preference in law and a CLEAR example of the Germans & French applying one law for themselves and another one for everyone else.

The clear conclusions to TMM are that the Troika have gone too far, and Eurozone deposit insurance is now worthless. The Troika have let the cat out of the bag, and TMM do not think it likely that this will eventually be implemented as it is likely to result in protests, serious rioting, and possible assassinations (given the alleged involvement of the Russian mafia). The market reaction to this is likely to be rather bad.
[TMM apologise for ranting.]

Friday, March 15, 2013

A Beer on Merve

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Merve the Swerve says something and the market decides to listen - this time. As we know, the market should have given up listening to Merve months ago and so really should ignore his last pompous departure monologues. But his comments appear to have landed on a market as short as GBP as they are confident that Jpy will fall. Which is quite a lot.

The resultant move in GBP has therefore solicited cries of "squeeze" rather than a volte-face.   But considering that the original move down is based on expectation of a volte-face on BoE policy then any volte-face on the volte-face should be considered as a double volte-face which, like a double negative, is a nothing. Dales comments this morning are hardly supportive of a new regime

BANK OF ENGLAND'S DALE SAYS TALK THAT CENTRAL BANKS SHOULD FOCUS MORE ON GROWTH IS "DANGEROUS"

BOE'S DALE SEES "CONSIDERABLE FLEXIBILITY" IN CURRENT INFLATION TARGETING REGIME TO SUPPORT OUTPUT, JOBS

BOE'S DALE - UNCLEAR THAT BOE COULD SIGNIFICANTLY BOOST ECONOMIC GROWTH WITHOUT GENERATING INFLATION

So perhaps the original premise of GBP going yennish, so beloved by 5 minute macro, is indeed seeing a classic squeeze. Playing cable on long term arguments is fine if you have deep pockets, but to paraphrase a "bearish website", "In a long enough time frame volatility on Cable moves to zero". Ok that isn't quite right but some members of TMM have been around for a while and mentally map cable as "1.70 plus or minus a bit".  Considering all the momentous events that have occurred globally and selectively to the US and UK over the past 25 years cable really is a mean reversion specialist.


So much for "trending to the outright forward" so beloved by various FX models.

The real widow maker in the short GBP basket has been Eur/GBP which has gone nowhere since the start of Feb when the mood of GBP bearishness really got underway. Which just highlights how messy Euro is in its own quiet way.

In general FX is in squeeze mode within a pretty dull background (if you strip out gbp and jpy) and we remain short of AUD/USD and AUD/ZAR  re. the post of couple of days ago. Though we have been accused of complicating the AUD trade by using ZAR as a counter, considering the whiplash in USD over the past few days, we suggest that using ZAR instead of USD in this environment may have actually have simplified it. And added some carry. ,

We are going to be away for a few days sliding down Alpine hills so will probably not be back until the end of next week. But this reminds us:- The TMM holiday FX indicator. "GBP will always base the moment we make our last purchase on a foreign holiday". For once we may have to thank Merve for something. A free beer.

Thursday, March 14, 2013

The Fat Cat and the Mousewife

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There is a great interrelationship of dependence in the markets that can see supposedly opposing interests living contently together in forms of symbiotic relationship. US debt and who owns it comes to mind. We can also see this symbiosis between politicians and business, the Fed and financial markets and even the interrelationship between the rich and the poor. This cold war detente can also be seen closer to home in personal relationships. So we have written a little allegorical poem and leave you to decide who the cat and the mouse are in real life as we think there are too many to pick from. 

The Fat Cat and the Mousewife

Cat leaves at dawn to earn the crust, 
Mouse stays behind to clean the dust
And cook the food and mend what's bust
A life of toil but, hey, needs must.   

But once Cat leaves this mouse will play 
Cat's out at work for all the day
So that's the time for making hay
But once Cat's back this mouse will say

"I toiled so hard, today was tough, 
Look, nails broke and palms so rough
Yet I can never do enough 
To clean and mend and all that stuff."

But once he's out, she'll say "lets see.
Tour the shops, take café tea?  
Or lunch with friends down by the sea?" 
But once Cat's home her tale will be      

"Oh my life you would not choose.
Left alone to clean the loos 
Who'd want to wear my weary shoes"
(Even if they're Jimmy Choos)

Yet unbeknownst to Mouse, Cat knows 
He has to pay the bills she owes.
But 'tis small price for all her woes
And hide the places that HE goes

For Cat's not fat without a reason 
Wines "clients" late, dines dams in season.
All adds to life a certain frisson.
But if found out he'd hang for treason. 

But here's the twist, Mouse also knows  
The texts, the lipstick on his clothes
The scents on shirts, the pantyhose  
But Cat and Mouse are old, old pros.

Neither dare upset the cart.   
And wreck the lives they know by heart
Easier that than brand new start. 
So Cat and Mouse will NEVER part.

Wednesday, March 13, 2013

Today's the Day the Pandas ate the Picnic.

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TMM have noted the markedly weak performance of HSCEI and HSI recently ( HSI threatening the 100 day moving average which has been pretty good support/resistance over the last 2 years) following fairly indifferent macro data showing that not a lot has changed - retail sales are soft, CPI is trending higher and as usual it seems to all be funded by a very large expansion of wealth management products. The market is not impressed and not without good reason.

TMM have also noted that more high frequency data on power production from www.serc.gov.cn has also shown very weak power demand growth which is generally associated with weaker steel, cement and metals output. TMM don't expect the situation to improve and while betting on iron falling is pricey given the curve, it has not stopped people selling down metals and miners.



Now, while much of this is more the concerns of Australia, China and mining companies, it should be remembered that a lot of S+P earnings come out of China - enough so that comments like this from the March Beige Book gave us pause: "A contact that supplies material for filtration says the global picture is difficult to pin down because Chinese New Year and the seasonal Christmas shutdowns in Europe made year-on-year comparison particularly difficult in recent months. Finally, several respondents expressed uncertainty regarding China, with one saying that some of his Chinese customers reported dramatic reductions in sales, inconsistent with government statistics."

To that end, TMM are not that shocked at how certain parts of the S+P with large shares of non-domestic sales are having a tough time in a torrid rally - look at autos or caterpillar for example. TMM think that when putting on the "USA OK!" trade, a little more thought should be done before filling your boots with E-minis.

Going back to China, TMM think that China's seeming preference for controlling inflation is going to make this year a tough one for equity investors as liquidity gets scaled back to avoid another inflationary pulse. The more interesting trades are likely to be in markets where relative input price stability may make it possible to conduct deregulation and much needed reforms, most notably in petroleum products and energy, and ultimately more financial liberalization.

Back to liquid macro however, TMM think the recent strength in AUD in the face of this says a great deal about how much faith the market has in US activity's ability carry the world with it. We aren't so sure and especially not in Australia. TMM think that given the slew of rubbish earnings and outlooks from engineering companies and mining services companies in Australia that capex is coming off fast and that the RBA is unlikely to be a long way behind the curve.

So TMM are looking to short AUD on this bounce, but are very aware that short AUS has been a back pocket trade for the macro world for a while now. Whilst "long term investors" and rate differential players are squeezing some of those positions out in the short term, short Aud/usd spec positions still persist.  So we may expand our Aud short thoughts beyond just usd and look for a counter that has great technicals - so why not ZAR? TMM are still of their "Township of the Damned" opinion on the country (and may we say - we nailed it) with its expanding current account and worsening terms of trade but, it has become a consensus now to the point of yennishness and is very crowded. The technical picture is also supportive with a very nice soothsayer signal in aud/zar suggesting now is a good time to counter the trend. We do, however, understand the risk of getting our comeuppance (Egyptian Pound longs style) for being contrary for the sake of being contrary but we think there is enough macro behind the China story to trigger a return to stronger old fashioned correlations in the markets and a wash out of some complacent positions.

Or in basic English .. "YOURS"

Finally, is it just our behavioural biases that are making us think that this week in March is particularly sensitive to turns or is there really something to it?

Thursday, March 7, 2013

Rate Traps and Mortgage Twists.

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After a day of no BoEase and a lot of ECBlah, TMM are distracting themselves from a market creep they are not aboard by thinking about the "QE-forever" talk that has never been that far away and about some of its longer term implications.

Now, obviously QE should affect everything denominated in fiat currency and TMM can wax lyrical about how if you define the word ‘help’ in a certain way, QE was the best invention since keyrings. But for brevity’s sake, today TMM will focus on the asset that has the largest impact on consumer behavior – housing. Due to data availability, we will just be look at housing in the US, although arguably the conclusions can be generalised.

Clearly, by driving down mortgage rates, QE has been enormously helpful for consumer spending. But just how helpful? Well, as of December, the US national average interest rate for existing mortgages was 4.87%, 10% lower than only 2 years ago and a full 17% lower than 2008 levels. If we take the same weightings as the BLS, who apply a 24% weight on primary residence costs in its CPI basket, we could deduce that the 17% drop in effective rates is an implied 4% bump in disposable income, or roughly 1% per year, before wealth effects are taken into account.

The impact on apparent housing affordability has been no less dramatic. The median US household income as of 2011 was ~$50,000, a level which has been broadly stable for the past 5 years. At the end of 2010, with mortgage rates at 5%, the average US household was able to afford a $301,000 house based on debt to income limitations on conventional mortgages. At the end of 2012, with mortgage rates at 3.5% and with income unchanged, the average family is able to afford a $360,000 house, a 20% increase. In other words, the decrease in mortgage rates has increased the maximum allowable home price to income ratio from 6.0 to 7.2. What’s not to like?





This, of course, is all part of the central bank master plan. By lowering real interest rates, the private sector will take on more debt, spend more, and prosperity can reign. Indeed this seems to be happening and with declining debt payments, US households appear to be re-levering and after a sharp drop, US house prices have started to tick up again relative to incomes:




But wait, there is more good news. Given that rates for new mortgages are still more than 25% below the average for existing mortgages, there is still a substantial easing in store. A continuation of recent trends would result in a further 50bp decline in existing mortgage rates over the next 2 years, (about 10% cheaper).





Now you may ask why TMM is concerned with all this good news (not that we don't like good news). The answer is embedded in the chart above. Note that the US has never survived an instance in the last 14 years where new mortgage rates exceed existing mortgage rates without the economy tipping into a recession. And that makes sense. Without increases in real income, mortgage rates which are no longer supportive to house prices ultimately result in declining expenditures. In other words, and this is the worrying implication, without income growth there is an interest rate at which the US will tip into a recession. And that rate is declining, even as the private sector re-leverages. In 2 year’s time, that rate will probably be ~4.5% for fixed rate mortgages. If mortgage to treasury spreads stay constant at ~150bps, that would imply a 3% recessionary ceiling for 10y treasury yields.

However, going further back in history we can see that there is one clear exception to this crossover rule. The 1994 bond collapse, where the swift and severe bond market fall had to be swiftly countered by Fed policy response to successfully contain economic fallout.



However today's proximity to the zero bound in both Fed rates and mortgage rates themselves sees there being no room to manoeuvre with either input other than with more QE. QE has been described by various prognosticators as a drug. On this basis TMM find it hard to disagree.

Now here is another little twist we have spotted. In addition to the fact that declining interest rates encourage leverage, they also act as a price for intergenerational wealth transfer. Huh? Well, new home buyers tend to be predominantly young families, while sellers tend to be retirees. As lower interest rates increase the present value of housing prices, new buyers increase leverage to purchase homes, and they take on a larger debts to do so.

Lower interest rates have helped delay the need to restructure social security and medicare, thereby allowing their funded status to worsen. As those programs are essentially inter-generational transfer vehicles, their worsening financials have been described as akin to the elderly stealing from the young. TMM would like to point out that artificially low mortgage rates do the same thing.

"One might argue that letting future generations bear the burden of population aging is appropriate, as they will likely be richer than we are even taking that burden into account." - Benjamin Bernanke, 2006

Grumpy Old Git Footnote- TMM can't really see what the problem is with the older generation having the wealth anyway. All the young have to do is wait a couple of years and they'll just inherit it, which is not an option if it were the other way around. And anyway, wealth is hardly something that hasn't been poured by the bucketload down the intergenerational divide at chez TMM to sustain the next generation's media hyped beliefs of normality. TMM have found that most things they have given their kids have either been broken or lost, so best we only let them have our possessions once we have finished with them! 

 
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